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MATTHEW G. ST. AMAND & DWIGHT H. MERRIAM*

Defensible Moratoria: The Law Before
and After the Tahoe-Sierra Decision
ABSTRACT
Governments at all levels have used land use permitting and
development moratoria as effective planning tools for decades.
The U.S. Supreme Court's Tahoe-Sierra decision last year,
upholding a 32-month moratorium on all development around
portions of Lake Tahoe, has heightened interest in moratoria. The
Tahoe-Sierra decision elicited comments from all sides, most
seeming to believe that the law had changed. Although
defensibility remains an issue, a definitive review of the cases
before Tahoe-Sierra; an analysis of the Tahoe-Sierra decision
itself; and a look at the cases decided since reveals that there has
been little change in the law. The objective of this article is to
illustrate how the law has evolved and to serve as a research tool
for landowners, governmental officials, advocacy groups, and the
courts.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision on April 23, 2002, in TahoeSierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency,' galvanized
everyone on the property rights continuum, from developers to local
planners, on the legality and wisdom of moratoria as a land planning
and regulation tool. There followed the usual spate of hyperbolic hand
wringing and jubilation, depending upon one's view of the world. The
National Association of Home Builders talked of "moratorium mania"
fearing that decision would spark widespread adoption of moratoria by
* Matthew G. St. Amand is a lawyer with the law firm of Robinson & Cole, LLP, in
Hartford, Connecticut, where he practices land use and real estate law. St. Amand earned a
B.A. in History and Geography from Mary Washington College, an M.R.P. from the
Department of City & Regional Planning at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
and a J.D. from the School of Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Prior
to joining the Landlaw Section at Robinson & Cole in 2003, St. Amand practiced land use
and real estate law for several years in central Florida.
** Dwight H. Merriam is a lawyer with the law firm of Robinson & Cole, LLP, in
Hartford, Connecticut, where he practices land use and real estate law. Merriam is past
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1. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
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local governments.' The country's preeminent planning organization, the
American Planning Association, predicted a virtual apocalypse in local
regulation and issued a press release dubbing the decision "a solid win
for planning."" In the some-things-never-change category, the press did
its usual poor job of accurately reporting what the decision really meant,
perhaps because it was simply too arcane for most to comprehend. For
example, the Los Angeles Times reported that "[tihe Supreme Court
upheld the government's power to impose a temporary ban on
development Tuesday, ruling in a Lake Tahoe case that property owners
are not due compensation whenever they are barred from building on
their land."'
Reality check-the decision in Tahoe-Sierra is actually factually
and legally narrow, and like most takings decisions characteristically ad
hoc. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, defined the question under
consideration: "The question presented is whether a moratorium on
development imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive
land-use plan constitutes a per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution."5
The sound bite description of the holding in the case is that a 32month moratorium to save a national treasure from certain destruction
does not effect a facial or per se compensable taking. As Justice Stevens
put it, "In rejecting petitioners' per se rule, we do not hold that the
temporary nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that it
effects a taking; we simply recognize that it should not be given
exclusive significance one way or the other. " 6 Stevens concluded for the
Court "that the interest in 'fairness and justice' will be best served by
relying on the familiar Penn Central approach when deciding cases like
7
this, rather than by attempting to craft a new categorical rule."
It is important to note that nearly all land use regulatory takings
claims are brought as as-applied, not facial, challenges. A property
owner sues the government over the application of a land use regulation
to a specific piece of property in a particular instance. The claim only has
to do with the application of the regulation to the subject property and
no others. That said, and for reasons too complex and irrelevant to be
2. See Patricia E. Salkin, U.S. Supreme Court Hands Two Big Wins to Municipal
Governments in 2001-2002 Term, 31 REAL ESTATE L.J. 83, 86-87 (2002), citing National
Association of Homebuilders, Supreme Court's Lake Tahoe Decision Could Trigger Moratorium
Mania (Apr. 24, 2002), at www.nahb.com.
3. Id.
4. David G. Savage, The Nation: Landowners Dealt Blow by Justices, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24,
2002, at Al.
5. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 306.
6. Id. at 337.
7. Id.
at 342.
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described in this modest effort, petitioner's challenge in Tahoe-Sierra
made its way through the appellate courts and up to the U.S. Supreme
Court as a facial challenge, and therein lies the primary reason that the
decision is a narrow one, particularly as it relates to what makes a
moratorium defensible. 8
A facial taking claim challenges the legality of a land use
regulation in general, based on the theory that, no matter how the
regulation is applied to any property, in every instance it would work a
taking of that property without just compensation in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. In other words, a facial taking occurs when the mere
enactment of the challenged regulation is a taking. A facial taking in the
land use context is highly unusual-not totally a matter of fantasy, like a
jackalope, 9 but something akin to a nearly extinct species, such as an
Asiatic cheetah.'0
The U.S. Supreme Court supplemented its holding in Tahoe with
extensive dicta on the subject of "fairness and justice" and in support of
1
land planning as an important activity. The Court specifically noted
that moratoria were a widely used and accepted growth management
tool, and stated that
[tihe interest in facilitating informed decisionmaking by
regulatory agencies counsels against adopting a per se rule
that would impose such severe costs on their deliberations.
Otherwise, the financial constraints of compensating
property owners during a moratorium may force officials
to rush through the planning process or to abandon the
practice altogether. To the extent that communities are
forced to abandon using moratoria, landowners will have
incentives to develop their property quickly before a
8. The main reason it evolved as a facial challenge was that, with more than 700
property owners, individual suits were procedurally and economically impossible and a
class action is not available for individual, as-applied takings claims. Also, a facial
challenge avoids the need to demonstrate finality.
9. See, e.g., Obituary Douglas Herrick-Jackalopeinventor, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2003, at
B05. A jackalope is a cross between an antelope or a deer and a jackrabbit created by
taxidermist Douglas Herrick when he stuck antlers on a stuffed jackrabbit. No such
creature exists in nature.
10. Asiatic Cheetahs are darker and somewhat larger than typical African cheetahs. See
http://www.cheetahspot.com/asiatic.php (last visited Sept. 12, 2003). The few remaining
Asiatic cheetahs live in Iran on the edge of the Kavir desert. See http://www.
asiaticcheetah.org/asiatic/index.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
11. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333 (considering seven listed points including alternative
approaches the Court might have taken to determine the best approach to ensure that
"justice and fairness" were met, weighing the merits of a number of per se rule possibilities
and finally pointing out that petitioners might have prevailed in their challenge under Penn
Central had they brought an as-applied challenge).
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comprehensive plan can be enacted, thereby fostering
inefficient and ill-conceived growth. 2
The Court also pointed out that a good moratorium might enhance
property values by providing for better protection of property in the
long run.13
Though it is not the focus of this article, which is more about the
defensibility of moratoria, perhaps the most important holding in TahoeSierra is that the Court adopts Justice Stevens' dissent in First English as
to the composition of the "relevant parcel." 4 The relevant parcel is now
comprised of not only a physical dimension and a functional dimension,
but a temporal dimension as well, such that the reality of long-term
ownership of real property is now a consideration in determining
whether or not relatively short-term prohibitions on use work a taking. 5
Even a shaman poking through the entrails of this decision will
find it hard to discern what the Court has told us about moratoria. All
that can be said with certainty from the holding alone is that a 32-month
moratorium to save Lake Tahoe from the adverse impacts of nonpoint
source stormwater runoff is not a facial taking, especially in light of the
fact that the average time that people have held lots at Lake Tahoe before
developing them is an extraordinary 25 years. 6 Nothing is said about asapplied challenges to moratoria and the Court is careful to point out that
the decision is a narrow one. 7
At a couple of points in the decision, the Court talks about a oneyear moratorium, which some might infer suggests an acceptable
duration.' 8 However, the Court clearly states that it is setting no standard
and there is no indication in the cases decided since Tahoe that there was
meant to be such a standard.' 9
To find out what the Tahoe-Sierra decision may mean for
moratoria going forward, we must start with a retrospective of the cases
before Tahoe-Sierra and analyze them on the basis of the criteria they
suggest for determining the defensibility of moratoria. A "defensible
moratorium" for our purposes is one legally enacted that does not effect
a compensable permanent or temporary regulatory taking. Those criteria
are:
12. Id. at 339.
13. Id. at 339-41.
14. Id. at 332. See discussion infra notes 233-243.
15. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332. See generally Dwight H. Merriam, Rules for the
Relevant Parcel,25 U. HAW. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
16. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 337.
17. Id. at 304-06.
18. See, e.g., id. at 341.
19. Id. See also, e.g., Haberman v. City of Long Beach, 298 A.D. 2d 497 (N.Y. App. Div.
2d Dep't 2002).
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" Authority to enact moratoria
" Duration of the moratorium
" Public interest intended to be served
* Burden on the private property owner
" Extent of other economic uses of the property during the
moratorium
* Availability of local administrative relief
We start first with a brief overview of the pre-Tahoe-Sierra
takings clause jurisprudence. 20 We then analyze the pre-Tahoe-Sierra
moratorium cases under the six criteria potentially affecting
defensibility. 2 After that, we review the Tahoe-Sierra decision in some
detail for its guidance on defensibility.2 Finally, we discuss the postTahoe-Sierra moratoria cases and what lessons have been learned." A
chart with the cases mentioned in this article and other cases of interest is
attached as the appendix to this article.
I. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT U.S. SUPREME COURT TAKINGS
JURISPRUDENCE
Some regulatory takings cases are relevant to moratorium cases
because moratoria are often challenged as takings. We discuss these
takings cases in order of general importance to moratorium cases and in
rough chronological order so that we may contrast and compare them
with the 1978 Penn Central decision.
In the famous, yet virtually moribund, 1992 decision in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,24 the U.S. Supreme Court found that a
categorical or per se regulatory taking occurs in the extraordinary case
where a regulation permanently deprives a property owner of all
economic value in the property. Since Lucas was handed down over a
decade ago, it has practically never determined the outcome of a takings
25
case.
20. See infra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 38-227 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 228-249 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 250-297 and accompanying text.
24. 505 U.S 1003 (1992).
25. There are maybe four cases where Lucas has made a difference. See, e.g., State ex. rel.
R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 780 N.E.2d 998 (Ohio 2002) (holding that property rights constitute a
separate and distinct property interest and parcel); Steel v. Cape Corp., 677 A.2d 634 (Md.
1996) (holding failure to upzone from institutional open space zoning classification
constituted a total taking); Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(affirming award of compensation); Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (1994) (holding
that landowner is entitled to compensation under local "total taking" analysis).
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Nearly every regulatory takings case is based on a partial taking,
and the decision ruling the roost since 1978, and recently re-ensconced at
the head of the pecking order by Palazzolo26 in 2001 and Tahoe-Sierra in
2002, is Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York.27
Penn Central established a three-part, fact-specific test for
determining whether a regulation worked an invalid, compensable
partial taking. The test was largely the result of the balancing of the ideas
that "'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by
public action [should] be compensated by the government, rather than
remain[ing] disproportionately concentrated on a few persons,"2 but
that "[glovernment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the [responsible] general law. " ' Under the Penn Central test,
the following factors are weighed to determine whether a regulation
effects a partial taking: (1) diminution in property value, (2) damage to
reasonable investment-backed expectations of the owner, and (3)
character of the government action, particularly as compared to the
public benefit as against the private burden." Penn Central has operated
as the default rule in regulatory takings cases, while Lucas has existed as
a rare exception to that default rule.
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided Agins v. City of Tiburon,31 a
precursor to the development moratoria cases, which, for purposes of
this article, stands for the proposition that "[m]ere fluctuations in value
during the process of governmental decisionmaking, absent extraordinary delay, are 'incidents of ownership.' They cannot be considered
as a 'taking' in the constitutional sense." 32 In Agins, the Court held that an
open space ordinance, effectively down-zoning appellants' property but
nevertheless permitting the construction of one to five single-family
residences on the property, (1) constituted a valid exercise of the City's
police power, effectively advancing legitimate governmental purposes of
protecting open space and countering the "ill effects" of urbanization,
and (2) did not deny the appellants "justice and fairness" under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments because the appellants, like the public,
benefited from the preservation of open-space, and, though they may
have suffered from some diminution in the value of their property, they

26.
27.
28.
29.
(1922)).
30.
31.
32.

533 U.S. 606 (2001).
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Id. at 124 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citing Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124-25.
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
Id. at 263 (quoting Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939)).
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were nevertheless "free to pursue their reasonable investment
expecta33
officials."
local
to
plan
development
a
submitting
by
tions
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los
Angeles County, the Supreme Court held that the temporary nature of a
government land use restriction-in that case a moratorium on
construction within a flood-prone valley-did not negate the possibility
that compensation might be required, and that just compensation
necessarily included the remedy of money damages. Despite the fact that
First English was decided on facts involving a moratorium, and despite
the fact that it was sometimes cited early on as a moratorium case, the
Supreme Court did not tell us as much about the general defensibility of
moratoria as did the Ninth Circuit in First English on remand. The result
on remand is discussed later in this article.35
M
Finally, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission'
and Dolan v. City
37
of Tigard (Nollan and Dolan) are frequently cited for the respective
propositions that (1) there must be an "essential nexus" between the
legislative imposition and a legitimate governmental objective and (2)
the regulatory means must be "roughly proportional" to the desired
regulatory end-not overly invasive for the purpose sought. These cases
are particularly relevant to the analysis of purpose in moratorium cases.
These cases are by no means all of the U.S. Supreme Court cases
that bear upon our analysis; however, they provide a considerable
foundation upon which to interpret takings cases in the general sense.
Let us look now at how the lower courts have typically approached
taking cases specifically involving moratoria or, as they are sometimes
called, "interim zoning" or "interim development" ordinances.
II. PRE-TAHOE-SIERRA MORATORIUM CASES
In general, the moratoria and interim development ordinance
cases before Tahoe-Sierra were decided on the basis of six factors:
authority to enact moratoria, duration of the moratorium, public interest
to be served, burden on the private property owner, extent of other
economic uses of the property during the moratorium, and availability of
local administrative relief.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Agins, 447 U.S. at 261-62.
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
See infra notes 140-141, 171-172, and accompanying text.
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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A. Authority to Enact Moratoria
Whether a local government may enact a moratorium is the
threshold issue. In the absence of express authority enabling the
enactment of local moratorium ordinances,; the conventional view is
that local governments may generally act under the police power to
adopt reasonable temporary moratorium ordinances, so long as they do
so in good faith, and so long as the adopted ordinances only limit
development for short periods. 9 In other words, courts have generally
upheld the enactment of moratoria ordinances based on police power
grounds. Courts have also found sufficient authority for moratoria in
home rule provisions.' General land planning enabling legislation,
though not expressly authorizing moratoria, may imply delegation of
authority to do so.4"
Some courts interpret general grants of state power broadly to
uphold moratoria. In State ex rel. SCA Chemical Waste Services, Inc. v.
Konigsberg,42 the Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld the enactment of a
resolution placing a temporary hold on the issuance of hazardous waste
treatment facility permits. The Court stated that the broad statutory
grant of general municipal powers was to be "liberally construed," and
the Court therefore held that municipalities were empowered to enact
interim zoning ordinances. In a Massachusetts case, the Supreme Judicial
Court held that the broadly worded general delegation to cities and
towns was sufficient to enable a town to enact a two-year apartment
construction moratorium, under its zoning power, while the town did
comprehensive planning.3
Whether enabling authority is express or implied, the legality of
a particular moratorium will sometimes turn on whether or not it was
properly enacted in accordance with the procedural requirements in the

38.

For a comprehensive discussion of such state enabling legislation, see EDWARD H.

ZIEGLER, RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 11.01[11] (1996) (cited in Sprint

Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson County, 968 F. Supp. 1457 (N.D. Ala. 1997); see also, e.g., Ord v.
Kitsap, 929 P.2d 1172 (Wash. App.1997) (citing self-executing authority to impose sixmonth moratorium under Forest Practices Act); Town of Grand Chute v. City of Appleton,
282 N.W.2d 629 (Wis. App. 1979) (interpreting such enabling legislation).
39. See, e.g., Metro Realty v. El Dorado County, 222 Cal. App. 2d 508, 516 (Cal. App. 3d
Dist. 1963); Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 245 N.W.2d 819 (Minn. 1976).
40. See, e.g., Boulder Builders Group v. City of Boulder, 759 P.2d 752 (Colo. Ct. App.
1988). See generally J. JUERGENSMEYER & T. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 3.9 (2003). Home rule powers are a general grant to local
governments under a state constitution or state statute to enact local laws.
41. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of Town of Westport, 619 A.2d
1160 (Conn. App. 1993).
42. 636 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1982).
43. Collura v. Town of Arlington, 329 N.E.2d 733 (Mass. 1975).
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base enabling law. The issue of conformity with procedural requirements
often arises where moratoria are enacted quickly in response to
perceived emergencies.
In Schoeller v. Board of County Commissioners of Park County," a
county board of commissioners adopted an emergency temporary "landfreeze" to maintain the status quo within the county until a
comprehensive plan could be adopted. The board adopted the freeze
without notice or hearing. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the
authority to enact such an interim measure could be reasonably implied
from the state enabling legislation authorizing the county board to
"regulate and restrict the use of buildings and land in unincorporated
areas of the county."45 The court further held that in order to make such
power meaningful, the board must have "appurtenant power" to enact
the interim freeze resolution without notice or hearing.46
In Jablinske v. Snohomish County, 7 an appellate court in
Washington held that the notice and hearing requirements in the state
enabling legislation did not apply in an emergency situation, as was
presented when owners of land surrounding an airport raced to pull
residential construction permits once it became clear that local planners
were studying the possibility of expanding the airport. In Matson v. Clark
County Board of Commissioners," a different division of the Washington
appellate court also interpreted the state enabling legislation as
authorizing a local board to adopt an emergency moratorium without
public notice and hearing. The Matson court stated, "if interim zoning is
to serve its purpose in a state with a permissive vested rights doctrine, it
must not be subject to time-consuming notice and hearing requirements
applicable to ordinary zoning. " 49
Somewhat stricter interpretation of state law can result in
invalidation of a moratorium, especially if there is no emergency. In
Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson County,"° the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama struck down a moratorium on cell tower
permitting, where it was enacted without notice and hearing and in the
absence of an emergency. The court made clear that the result would

44. 568 P.2d 869 (Wyo. 1977).
45. Id. at 874. The court acknowledged that there is a split nationwide as to whether or
not notice and hearing requirements must be strictly adhered to, particularly where an
emergency situation exists. Id.
46. Id. at 878.
47. 626 P.2d 543 (Wash. App. 1981) (twelve-month moratorium upheld without such
qualifying remarks as were stated by the Schoeller Court).
48. 904 P.2d 317 (Wash. App. 2d Div. 1995).
49. Id. (quoting RICHARD L. SETrLE, WASHINGTON LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.13, at 73 (1983)).
50. 968 F. Supp 1457 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
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have been different had there been a real emergency.5' Likewise, a New
Jersey court invalidated a timed growth control ordinance where the
court did not find that an emergency existed, and where state legislation
expressly prohibited the adoption of moratoria except in case of
52
emergency.
In City of Sanibel v. Buntrock,' a Florida appellate court held that,
in the absence of an emergency, a moratorium ordinance was invalid if
not enacted in accordance with the procedural requirements in the state
zoning enabling act. That said, more than one court has upheld the
enactment of a temporary moratorium, where that moratorium was
enacted without notice or a hearing and where the court
made no
4
express finding that an urgent or emergent situation existed.
Having discussed situations where courts have liberally
construed enabling legislation or equated moratoria with zoning in
finding grants of local authority, we must now look at the other end of
that broad spectrum of judicial interpretation-not all state courts have
upheld local moratoria ordinances or regulations in the absence of
specific state enabling legislation. The analysis often turns on whether or
not the moratorium is an essential part of, or necessarily appurtenant to,
the power to zone.
In Naylor v. Township of Hellam," the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania recently held that a temporary moratorium on residential
subdivision and land development, adopted by the Township of Hellam
in the absence of express state enabling legislation, was invalid as an
improper exercise of municipal power under Pennsylvania law. The
court recognized that "zoning enabling legislation, as opposed to zoning
ordinances themselves, must be liberally construed in order to effect its
purposes,"56 and the court expressly acknowledged its awareness that
many other states have upheld the enactment of local temporary
moratoria legislation in the absence of express enabling legislation.57
51. Id. at 1468 (stating that the majority position was to require strict adherence to
procedural notice and hearing requirements, except in the case of an emergency).
52. Toll Bros., Inc. v. W. Windsor Twp., 712 A.2d 266 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1998).
53. 409 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
54. See Herrington v. City of Pearl, 908 F. Supp. 418 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (discussed infra at
notes 134-135 and 162-163 and accompanying text). A moratorium is necessarily
temporary, so the use of the term "temporary" to describe a moratorium is redundant and
grating; however, the courts continue to use this particular modifier, so it occasionally
appears in this article. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302. See also CREED v. Cal. Coastal
Zone Conservation Comm., 43 Cal. App. 3d 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1974) (standing in
part for proposition that interim ordinances enacted to protect "priceless coastal resources"
may be validly enacted without notice or public hearing).
55. 773 A.2d 770 (Penn. 2001).
56. Id. at 774.
57. Id. at 777.
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Nevertheless, the court interpreted the Pennsylvania municipal land
planning enabling statute as delegating to municipalities the power to
carry out comprehensive planning and zoning, but not the power to
enact moratoria." In an eight-to-one decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that moratoria ordinances are separate and distinct from
zoning ordinances and not necessarily incidental to the effectuation."9
Some courts have distinguished moratoria ordinances prohibiting certain uses from those that prohibit or limit the issuance of
permits. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the power to zone
under the general police power did not include the power to enact an
ordinance imposing a moratorium on the filing of site plans and
preliminary subdivision plats.6" The court held that such a moratorium
was more akin to a "ministerial" subdivision regulation than a zoning
ordinance.6' In Building Industry Legal Defense Foundation v. Superior
Court,62 a California appellate court invalidated a city ordinance that
suspended the formal processing of development applications on the
grounds that the zoning power to establish uses did not include the
power to suspend processing development applications, particularly
where those application procedures were set forth in state statutes.
Municipalities adopting moratoria by resolution, rather than by
ordinance, sometimes have had problems in the courts. In Bittinger v.
Corporationof Bolivar6 a town council adopted a resolution placing a 90day moratorium on the issuance of building permits. The Supreme Court
of West Virginia concluded that a moratorium on the issuance of
building permits was not a zoning ordinance, stating that "the
distinguishing factor between the two types of permits is that a building
permit involves how that use is undertaken, while a zoning permit
"
4
concerns whether a certain area may be used for a particular purpose.
The court held that under state law a moratorium resolution cannot
amend a building ordinance. The Minnesota Supreme Court employed
similar reasoning to strike down a "hold order" on the issuance of
building permits in Alexander v. Minneapolis.' The court held that the
58. Id.
59. Id. at 777. See also L.S. Fletcher, et al. v. Porter, 452 Cal. App. 1962 (Cal. App. 1st
Dist. 1962) (holding that an ordinance freezing growth or development is distinguishable
from "zoning ordinances," which affect allowable land uses).
60. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Home, 215 S.E.2d 453 (Va. 1975).
61. Id. at459.
62. 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828 (Ct. App. 1999).
63. 295 S.E.2d 554 (W.Va. 1990).
64. Id. at 558.
65. Id. at 558-59.
66. 125 N.W. 2d 583 (Minn. 1963) (acknowledging that municipality had the power to
zone but refusing to infer from that power the power to indefinitely suspend application of
zoning ordinance).
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power to zone did not include the power to suspend the application of a
zoning ordinance by operation of a moratorium resolution, where there
was no express grant of that power.61
In an interesting twist on the "court strikes down the
moratorium as not a zoning ordinance" theme, the City of Indianapolis
tried to defend a resolution requesting a temporary freeze on the
issuance of permits for off-track betting facilities by arguing in part that
the resolution was merely a request to its building department, and not a
zoning ordinance that needed to be enacted with the formality of such
ordinances.6 The Federal District Court found that there was no enabling
authority in any event for the moratorium in question. 69
It is evident that courts are all over the landscape on the enabling
issue. At one end you have the Pennsylvania Naylor court refusing to
interpret general zoning legislation as allowing local governments to
enact moratoria, and for the polar opposite you have a California
appellate court stating, in Metro Realty v. The County of El Dorado, that
reasonableness is the yardstick in determining the validity of a "stopgap" zoning ordinance, rather than whether or not the local government
has been enabled.70 Most courts interpret the police power broadly,
allowing local governments to enact what has been increasingly71
recognized as a mainstream planning and growth management tool.
However, it is important to note that some courts have refused to either
find or imply the authority to enact moratoria, because many states do
not have express enabling legislation, and many states have general
zoning enabling statutes based on the Standard Zoning Enabling Act,
which does not directly address growth management regulations or
moratoria.7
B. Duration of the Moratorium
How long is too long? This is an enduring but not endearing
question in moratorium cases. Tahoe-Sierra held that duration was a
necessary consideration in moratoria cases, but this was nothing new.
Courts interpreting the validity of moratoria have always considered
67. Id.
68. Sagamore Park v. City of Indianapolis, 885 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
69. Id.
70. 35 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (Ct. App. 1963).
71. See, e.g., Bradfordville Phipps Ltd. v. Leon County, 804 So. 2d 464, 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (citing Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864, 874 (2001) (both cases
citing Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764
(9th Cir. 2000) in dicta regarding the importance of planning and the role of moratoria as a
valuable tool).
72.

See generally, DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 79 (2003).
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duration, whether under the umbrella of weighing the individual burden
and expectations against the public purpose under Penn Central or
otherwise.
In the frequently-cited case of Woodbury Place Partners v.
Woodbury,2 the Minnesota Court of Appeals held there was no facial
taking in the adoption, under a state statute, of a two-year moratorium
on acceptance or consideration of subdivisions, site plans, or rezonings
of undeveloped areas adjacent to a highway. The moratorium was to
preserve a potential highway corridor for acquisition following a
planning process. Despite the partnership's stipulation that the
moratorium would temporarily deny all economically viable use of the
property for two years,74 the court found no Lucas-type categorical
taking:
We interpret the phrase "all economically viable use for
two years" as significantly different from "all
economically viable use" as applied in Lucas. The twoyear deprivation of economic use is qualified by its
defined duration...."All economically viable use from
March 23, 1988 to March 23, 1990" [the language from
the stipulation] recognizes that economic viability exists
at the moratorium's expiration.7
This is an important point-courts consistently have held that Lucas does
not dictate that a moratorium on all use is necessarily a taking because a
moratorium is usually for a defined, short period. 7 Woodbury Place
Partnersalso foreshadowed the result in Tahoe-Sierra.
On remand, a California appellate court held in First English that
a delay of more than two years was not unreasonable. 7 In Williams v.
City of Central, the Colorado Court of Appeals analyzed the remands in
First English, Agins, and Woodbury Place Partners:
[A]n interim regulation prohibiting construction or
development is not a temporary taking even if such
restrictions would be held too onerous to survive scrutiny
had they been permanently imposed. Absent extraordinary
delay, fluctuations in value that occur during a temporary

73. 492 N.W.2d 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
74. Id. at 260.
75. Id. at 261. Accord Williams v. City of Central, 907 P.2d 701 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (no
taking by 10-month interim gaming moratorium).
76. The pre-Tahoe-Sierra cases, with very few exceptions, bear this out. See, e.g.,
Williams v. City of Central, 907 P. 2d 701 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (stating no categorical
taking on grounds that moratorium was temporary).
77. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr.
893 (Ct. App. 1989) (interim ordinance not a taking).
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moratorium enacted to effect the process of governmental
decisionmaking are, simply, incidents of ownership.78
How long is too long will generally depend upon the reason for
the moratorium, as discussed in the following subsection. 9 An
emergency moratorium, enacted without the general notice and hearing
procedural safeguards, should last only so long as is required to give the
notice, have the hearing, and properly enact the permanent fix.u0 At the
same time, there are some oddities where long moratoria survived
challenge: a Maryland appellate court found that an eight-year sewer
moratorium on development in most of the county was not a taking;8' a
Washington state appellate court found that a six-year moratorium on
building pursuant to a state forestry statute was valid;8 2 and, in one New
York county, a moratorium on sewer extensions including main line
extension permits remained in effect for approximately ten years, by
state order.8 Again, it appears that a compelling governmental purpose
makes a long duration reasonable.
The courts readily approve short moratoria. In Kawaoka v. City of
Arroyo Grande,' a one-year water moratorium on certain development
applications was upheld by the Ninth Circuit as not violative of
substantive due process and equal protection. That court stressed that,
even if it could be argued that the moratorium delayed development of
property for a year, such a short-term delay does not rise to
constitutional dimensions.85 In a similar decision, the Maryland Court of
Appeals found that a nine-month moratorium to revise a comprehensive
plan and a zoning plan was not unreasonable.6 The court held that
"there is nothing in First English which alters the established principle
78. Williams, 907 P.2d at 704 (citing First English, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893; Agins, 157 Cal Rptr.
375).
79. See, e.g., Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Com., 486 A.2d
330, 333 (N.J. 1985) (relationship between purpose and duration of moratoria bears heavily
upon reasonableness).
80. Schoeller v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of County Park, 568 P.2d 869 (Wyo. 1977).
81. Offen v. County Council of Prince George's County, 625 A.2d 424, 435 (Md. App.
1993) (all economically viable uses are not prohibited), rev'd on grounds unrelated to the
withdrawn constitutional takings claim, County Council of Prince George's County v. Offen,
639 A.2d 1070 (Md. 1994).
82. Ord v. Kitsap County, 929 P.2d 1172 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
83. HBP Assocs. v. Marsh, 893 F. Supp. 271, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting a property
owner's claim for compensation on ripeness grounds). The moratorium was in effect from
1986 until it was lifted in accordance with a Permit Modification issued by the New York
Department of Environmental Conservation on January 18,1996.
84. 17 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1994) (evidence of irrationality, racial discrimination
insufficient).
85. Id. at 1237. See also Mont Belvieu Square, Ltd. v. City of Mont Belvieu, 27 F. Supp.
2d 935 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (upholding six-month planning moratorium on similar grounds).
86. S.E.W. Friel v. Triangle Oil Co., 543 A.2d 863 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
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that the interim burden imposed on a landowner during the
government's decisionmaking process, absent unreasonable delay, does
not constitute a taking....
In Meadowland Regional Development Agency v. Hackensack
Meadowlands Development Commission,8 the New Jersey superior court for
the appellate division went so far as to hold that a 26-month development
freeze on the use of ten thousand acres of land in the Hackensack
Meadowlands was not unreasonable while the commission prepared
and adopted a master plan. In Metro Realty v. The County of El Dorado,' a
California court of appeals held that a one-year ban on residential
construction in certain parts of a county, which could be extended for
two additional years, was reasonable while the county worked on a
water supply conservation plan. That said, the Wyoming Supreme Court
held that a five-year moratorium on development in unzoned areas of a
town, designed to protect the status quo while the local government
engaged in comprehensive planning studies and activities, was too long,
particularly where it appeared to the court that the local government had
9°
not been "diligent" in creating or adopting such a plan.
91
In Santa Fe Village Venture v. City of Albuquerque, the
Albuquerque City Council adopted a property acquisition policy and
building moratorium for one year for private properties located within
the Petroglyph National Monument. The Council extended the
92
moratorium for six months and then for another year. The time limits
were carefully crafted to follow the anticipated periods for Congress to
act on legislation creating the Petroglyph National Monument, and
during the last year of the moratorium all property owners who applied
from
for building permits were assured of approval within 12 months
94
3
had occurred.
the date of application. The court found no taking
Courts sometimes uphold open-ended moratoria. In Metropolitan
5
Dade County v. Rosell Construction Corp., a Florida appellate court
87. Id. at 867 (citing Guinnane v. County of San Francisco, 241 Cal. Rptr. 787 (Ct. App.
1987).
88. 293 A.2d 192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
89. 35 Cal. Rptr. 480 (Ct. App. 1963).
90. Schoeller, 568 P.2d at 879. See also STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 4-10(b),
at 33 (2d ed. & Supp. 2002) (citing to the Florida trial court decision in Shadek v. Monroe
County Bd. of County Comm'ns, No. CAP95-398 (Fl. Cir. Ct. July 17, 2001) as holding that a
series of rolling moratoria prohibiting development for eight years violated the takings
clause).
91. 914 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D.N.M. 1995).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 297 So. 2d 46 (1974). See also CREED v. Cal. Coastal Zone Conservation Comm., 43
Cal. App. 3d 306, 320-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dis 1974) (distinguishing interim development
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upheld a temporary freeze on the issuance of all building permits for any
construction that would connect into the North Miami Ocean Outfall
System. The county pollution control officer determined that there was
an inadequate safety margin available within the system to deal with
surge pressures in the North Dade sewerage line, and the permitting ban
was to be in effect until that deficiency could corrected." Similarly, a
Texas appeals court upheld a resolution prohibiting the issuance of
building permits within a historic district until such time as the historic
district planning process was "resolved."'
In Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore," the city enacted a zoning ordinance prohibiting the issuance
of building permits until school overcrowding was relieved. The
California Supreme Court upheld the ordinance even though it did not
specifically define "overcrowded," where the ordinance could be read as
incorporating local school district standards regarding overcrowding. 9 A
California appellate court refused to invalidate a moratorium on water
service connections that was to remain in effect "until additional water
sources [were] developed and/or an adequate supply [was] demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Department."'
Not all courts have upheld open-ended moratoria. In Deal
Gardens, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Village Loch Arbour,'°' the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that an open-ended moratorium had continued
beyond the point where the reason for the purpose behind the
moratorium supported the restriction. The Deal Gardens court stated,
"One of the more dangerous aspects of this type of legislation arises from
the damage which may result if there is no restriction of the period of
time during which a restraint against some land use is permitted to
continue. Plainly there must be some terminal point." t'° The court then
found that a moratorium, enacted to maintain the status quo during a
planning and zoning study period, had exceeded a reasonable duration
where two years had elapsed since the adoption of the moratorium. The
court held that two years was more than enough time for the town to
meet its planning and zoning needs.10 restriction that will terminate upon the formulation of a Coastal Zone Plan from zoning
regulations that permanently restrict development, or do so for an "indefinite" period of

time).
96. Metro. Dade County, 297 So. 2d at 47.
97. Dallas v. Crownrich, 506 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex. App. 1974).
98. 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976).
99. Id. at 482.
100. Gilbert v. California, 266 Cal Rptr. 891, 893 (Ct. App. 1990).
101. 226 A.2d 607 (1967).
102. Id. at 611.
103. Id. at 612. See also Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 750-52 (9th Cir. Cal. 1975)
(moratorium may be a taking when imposed without specifying when it will end).
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The case of Steel v. Cape Corp.1 is not expressly a moratorium
case but is of interest because the effect of a town's failure to rezone a
landowner's property was to prohibit the landowner from developing
that property, at least in the short term. In Steel, the Anne Arundel
County Commissioners denied a property owner's application to rezone
its land from open space to residential, which would make it more
valuable."'5 The property was previously rezoned from a residential
classification to open space in 1973 on petition from an association that
had no legal interest in the property. Five years later the actual owner,
Cape Corporation, discovered the downzoning. The county recognized
its mistake and said it would rezone it to residential in a 1987
comprehensive rezoning.'O' It did not.IW Cape Corporation petitioned for
the rezoning in 1993, but the county refused to do it because the schools
were not adequate to serve the residential use.08 The most optimistic
9
estimate was that the schools would not be adequate for six years.'0 The
court found an as-applied regulatory taking based on the minimum
delay of six years.
The short summary of the law as to duration is that there is no
"°
set defensible duration-the test is reasonableness. Six months for a
general planning "pause" seems acceptable if not followed by more
moratoria of the same type. Planning moratoria of up to two or three
years may be acceptable, depending upon the complexity of the issues
involved, and so long as the local government is diligently pursuing its
planning objectives. Still longer moratoria may be defensible to deal with
more serious problems, like utility matters, or matters that have been
targeted by a state legislature in express enabling legislation. The
acceptable duration is going to be in large part a function of the purpose
behind the moratorium, to which we now turn.
M

C. Public Interest Intended to Be Served
Along the way we have identified several valid public purposes
for moratoria, which we will not further review. Here we discuss cases
that were decided largely on the question of public interest. Keep in
mind that whether or not a public interest will support a particular
moratorium cannot be determined in a vacuum, and, even before Nollan
and Dollan, factors affecting the essential nexus between the moratoria
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

677 A.2d 634 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
Id. at 635-36.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 643, n.19.
See, e.g., Metro Realty v. County of El Dorado, 35 Cal Rptr. 480 (Ct. App. 1963).
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and the public interest or factors bearing upon the necessary degree of
regulation were considerations.
Many courts have upheld the enforcement of moratoria as valid
"stop-gap" measures during the land planning process, generally on the
grounds that maintaining the status quo and preventing poorly thought
out development during the planning and study periods is legitimate. " '
An 18-month moratorium on developing parcels of two or more acres,
giving the community time to develop a plan to preserve scarce land for
affordable housing, is not a taking.1 '2 A four-month moratorium on
special use applications is permissible when used during development of
a new plan and regulations for quarries."3 A three-month moratorium on
1 14
the issuance of hazardous waste permits to allow for planning is valid,
as is a moratorium on the issuance of fast-food permits within a given
district, until a pending historic preservation ordinance is adopted." 5
6
Note, however, that, in City of Glenn Heights v. Sheffield Development Co.,"
a Texas court struck down a planning moratorium as no longer
substantially advancing a legitimate state interest, where the planning
and zoning study period had ended and the city council could not get
the required votes to adopt the study.
An emergency prohibition or repeal was upheld in 216 Sutter
Bay Ass'n v. County of Sutter"7 on a unique set of facts. In 1989, the Board
of Commissioners for rural Sutter County in the Sacramento
metropolitan area began studying the possibility of creating four new
towns "sprouting from 25,000 acres of farmland" within the county."8 At
the end of 1991, the commissioners voted to adopt their study, the
General Plan Amendment (GPA), as part of, or in place of, the existing
county plan."9 Under a referendum procedure, concerned citizens
collected enough signatures to put the question of the GPA to a vote of
the county residents. Before that vote could take place, interim
commissioner elections were held, and some members of the board were
replaced.'20 The new board members were to take office in January of

111. See, e.g., Friel v. Triangle Oil Co., 543 A.2d 863 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
112. Tocco v. N.J. Council on Affordable Housing, 576 A.2d 328 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1990).
113. Nello L. Teer Co. v. Orange County, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12525 (4th Cir. 1993).
114. Tenn. ex. rel. SCA Chemical Waste Servs., Inc. v. Konigsberg, 636 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn.
1982).
115. A. Copeland Enterprises, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 372 So. 2d 764 (La. Ct. App.
1979).
116. 61 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. App. 2001).
117. 68 Cal Rptr. 2d 492 (Ct. App. 1997).
118. Id. at 494.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 495.
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1993.2' During December of 1992, the outgoing majority on the board
approved 19 development agreements under the GPA, which were to
vest several days after the new board took office." Upon taking office,
the new majority immediately instituted a temporary repeal or hold of 45
days on the vesting of the development agreements until the new board
could repeal them.2" This emergency ordinance was upheld on the
grounds that the development agreements under the GPA, if they had
vested, would have posed an immediate threat to the public health,
safety, and welfare, in that they would have altered the community and
the way of life in Sutter County in a "radical and fundamental
manner."124
The need to balance growth can support a moratorium. In
Collura v. Town of Arlington,'2' the town of Arlington, Massachusetts,
enacted a two-year moratorium on the construction of apartment
buildings in a certain district, in order to give the town time to amend its
comprehensive plan. The evidence in the record showed that in the
decade leading up to the moratorium, 68 percent of all construction
within the moratorium district had been apartment construction, as
compared to 17 percent in the previous decade.126 The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court stated that the test for enforceability was
"whether there is 'any substantial relation between the amendment and
act.' ,127
the furtherance of any of the general objectives in the enabling
The Court found such a1 2 substantial relation and held that the purpose
was therefore legitimate. 1
In one of the earliest growth management cases, the Ninth
Circuit upheld a five-year ceiling on residential development in the San
Francisco suburb of Petaluma, finding that the "exclusion" bore a
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest-namely, the City's
"desire to preserve its small town character, its open spaces and low
density of population, and to grow at an orderly and deliberate pace.""
Furthermore, in Sturges v. Chilmark,"o a town on Martha's Vineyard
enacted an ordinance establishing a de facto moratorium to slow
residential growth for a period of ten years to protect the rural character

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
(Mass.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
216 Sutter Bay Assoc. v. County of Sutter, 68 Cal Rptr. 2d 492, 495 (Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 497.
329 N.E.2d 733 (Mass. 1975).
Id. at 739.
Id. at 737 (quoting Lanner v. Bd. of Appeal of Tewksbury, 202 N.E.2d 777, 783
1964)).
Collura,329 N.E.2d at 780-81.
Constr. Indus. Assoc. v. Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897,909 (9th Cir. 1975).
402 N.E.2d 1346 (Mass. 1980).
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of the town. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted that the
Town of Chilmark was decidedly rural and acknowledged that this type
of growth management ordinance was typically used to stem growth
and to preserve rural character in expanding metropolitan areas.1
Nevertheless, the court, relying in part on its earlier decision in Collura,
upheld the ordinance,
citing the "unique and perishable qualities" of
32
Martha's Vineyard.
The amazing expansion of the gaming industry in recent years
has created not only political, social, and economic turmoil and some
windfalls for both the public and private sectors, but also an interest in
moratoria. The city of Central, Colorado, imposed a moratorium on
development in the gaming district to study growth induced by the
industry. This moratorium
was held not to be a temporary taking absent
"extraordinary delay. - 133
At least one temporary moratorium aimed at enhancing
economic value and encouraging diversity of commerce has been
upheld. In Herrington v. City of Pearl," a federal court in Mississippi
upheld a four-year moratorium on mobile home establishments aimed at
overcoming what the city perceived to be a "negative image arising from
its unwanted reputation as the 'Home-of-the-Double-Wides' and the
'
'Mobile Home Sales Capitol.""' 35
In a unique example of a court upholding a moratorium
effectively aimed at a single developer, the Wyoming Supreme Court
sustained a building permit freeze placed on a single subdivision to
protect downstream residential owners from serious and significant
erosion problems.'" The City of Cheyenne placed a temporary hold on
the issuance of building permits within a particular hillside subdivision,
after the developer of that subdivision had repeatedly refused to comply
with city erosion and runoff regulations.37 The development of that
subdivision had dramatically increased runoff onto the properties of
downstream landowners, causing significant flooding." The court
agreed that the permitting freeze was necessary, given the developer's
failure to comply with erosion and runoff regulations. 39
131. Id. at 253-54.
132. Id. at 255. See also W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. Town of Southampton, 261 A.D.2d 609
(N.Y. App. Div 2d Dep't 1999) (New York appellate court upholding a moratorium on
development during preparation of a generic environmental impact statement for one of
the largest remaining undeveloped tracts in the Pine Barrens).
133. Williams v. City of Central, 907 P.2d 701.
134. Herrington v. City of Pearl, 908 F. Supp. 418 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
135. Id. at 421.
136. Sun Ridge Dev. v. Cheyenne, 787 P.2d 583 (Wyo. 1990).
137. Id. at 590.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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The protection of the public safety has been held to constitute a
"preeminent" state interest and clearly stands as a valid purpose in
support of moratoria. On remand in First English,"' a California appellate
court held that a permanent or temporary moratorium designed to
protect life and property, by prohibiting the construction or
reconstruction of any buildings in a flood-prone canyon after a
disastrous flood, could not constitute a taking. 4 '
Before moving on to discuss the burden on the landowner in the
next subsection of this article, it is helpful to take a quick look at a few
cases in which courts have examined the nexus between the moratoria
adopted and the purposes proffered as justification.
Nexus is essential to a defensible moratorium. Without a
supportable connection between the governmental objective and the
moratorium, the risk that the moratorium will be invalidated is great. In
Seawall Associates v. City of New York, 42 the City instituted a five-year
moratorium on the conversion, alteration, and demolition of certain
affordable residential apartment units, for the stated purpose of
alleviating homelessness by increasing, or at least maintaining, the lowincome housing stock. 143 The moratorium was struck down for several
reasons, one of which was that the nexus between the moratorium and
the stated purpose was found to be tenuous, in that maintaining or even
increasing the supply of affordable units did not necessarily address the
homeless situation.4
In a New Jersey case decided prior to Nollan and Dolan, a trial
court struck down a 180-day moratorium that temporarily prohibited the
construction of multi-family dwelling units and the conversion of motels
into condominiums, while the township studied the adequacy of the
public water supply." The court held that there was insufficient
evidence on the record to show that the moratorium as enacted had any
"real, legitimate and substantial relationship" to the accomplishment of
the stated objective." The court also failed to understand why
commercial uses such as car washes and laundromats were excluded

140. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr.
893 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1989).
141. Id. at 898.
142. 74 N.Y.2d 92 (1989) (the moratorium had several additional restrictions and was
struck down for a number of reasons in addition to those set forth herein).
143. Id. at 110.
144. Id. at 111-12.
145. New Jersey Shore Builders Assoc. v. Township Comm. of Dover, 468 A.2d 742 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1983).
146. Id. at 744 (no evidence that expert testimony was ever considered regarding water
users and water supply).
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from the moratorium if the purpose
was to conserve water while
47
studying the local water supply.
Where the nexus is strong, the moratorium will survive. In
Gilbert v. State of California, a California appellate court relied upon
Nollan in support of its decision to uphold a moratorium on water
service connections. A state agency conditioned the issuance of an
operating license to a district water supply plant upon the district's
continuation of its moratorium on water service connections.' 49 The court
held that the moratorium substantially promoted the valid public health
purpose of ensuring a continuous supply of potable water.
In Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore,'5 decided 11 years before Nollan, the California Supreme Court
found that although a building permit freeze might have a chilling effect
on immigration into the City of Livermore, the ordinance did not need to
be supported by a compelling state interest. 52 The court held that the
ordinance-designed to buy the city time to address school overcrowding problems-was valid as "reasonably related to the welfare of
the local region affected by the ordinance."" 3
A court is more likely to uphold a moratorium where there is a
direct connection to protecting the public's health and safety.
D. Burden on the Private Property Owner
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that land use
regulations do not effect a taking if they substantially advance legitimate
state interests and do not deny property owners all economically viable
use of land." Therefore, the initial analysis of the burden on the
landowner for our purposes generally focuses on whether or not the
moratorium deprives a landowner of all economic use.
For example, as we saw earlier in Steel v. Cape Corp.,'55 the
rezoning denial, which effectively prohibited all development for at least
six years, was an as-applied taking. Similarly, in Seawall the court struck
down prohibitions on single room occupancy conversion largely because
M

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 745.
266 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1990).
Id. at 894.
Id. at 903.
557 P.2d 473 (1976).
Id. at 476.
Id.
See Nollan v. California Costal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
677 A.2d 634 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.1996).
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the "voluntary" buyout provisions virtually proved how onerous the
burden was for the property owner.6
Steel and Seawall, however, illustrate the exception rather than
the rule, and neither was clearly decided as a moratorium case. In
moratorium cases, the temporary nature of the restriction generally leads
to the conclusion that the burden on the affected private party is not so
great as to cause a taking.
Typical of the moratorium cases is Metro Realty, in which a state
appellate court found that the burden imposed upon a landowner, as a
result of the county's residential construction moratorium during a
countywide water resources and conservation study, even if it lasted
three years, was temporary, and therefore like hardships imposed by
57
many valid exercises of the police power." The Metro Realty court
further held that, even if the plaintiff's property were later taken by the
county to be part of its new reservoir, the law of eminent domain would
58
require appropriate compensation at that time. Likewise, in City of
Glenn Heights v. Sheffield Development Co., the Texas appellate court
emphasized that "[dietermining whether all economically viable use of a
property has been denied [by a government regulation] entails a
relatively simple analysis of whether the property has any value after the
59
governmental action."' In yet another case, a Florida appellate court,
having observed that "a truly temporary land use injunction or
moratorium looks more like a permitting delay than a compensable
6
regulatory taking,"' 0 relied upon the Ninth Circuit decision in TahoeSierra to maintain that there is no temporary taking by the enactment of a
development moratorium,161 where the future use of the property has a
substantial present value.
Sometimes any burden is offset by benefits or there is no legally
cognizable interest. In Herrington v. City of Pearl,the ban on mobile home
sales establishments in Pearl, Mississippi, was held not to deny a
landowner of all economic value in his property, where it was shown the
value of the land subject to the moratorium increased significantly
62
during the moratorium. The court in City of Pearl also held the
that
156. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1068 (N.Y. 1989). Note
New
in Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972), the highest court in
the
York upheld a moratorium with a capital improvement buyout provision where
of
purpose of the growth management ordinance was to tie the rate of growth to the rate
capital improvements.
1963).
157. Metro Realty v. El Dorado County, 35 Cal. Rptr. 480,486-87 (Cal. Ct. App.
158. Id. at 486.
159. 61 S.W.3d 634,647 (2001).
App.
160. Bradfordville Phipps Ltd. v. Leon County, 804 So. 2d 464, 471 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
2001).
161. Id.
162. Herrington v. City of Pearl, 908 F. Supp. 418,424-25 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
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landowner could not have been burdened by the regulation in any event,
because the government made no final determination that the
moratorium affected the landowner's property. 63 In a case turning on the
lack of a protected interest, the Seventh Circuit held that the owner of an
option to purchase property could not have been burdened by a
moratorium on siting of landfills because an option is not an interest
protected by the takings clause."
A final case deserves mention in this subsection because it
illustrates how state tests may vary from the federal. In Nolen v. Newtown
Township," the township of Newtown, Pennsylvania, enacted an
ordinance prohibiting the subdivision of land for 18 months, while the
township reviewed its subdivision ordinance. An owner of two parcels
in the township challenged the ordinance on takings grounds. The
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas reconsidered several of the
Township's objections in light of the Ninth Circuit's decision in TahoeSierra, which came down while Nolen was pending."M The court then
concluded that the decision in Tahoe-Sierra (holding no taking) did not
affect its determination that Newtown's moratorium did cause a taking
because the federal standard for the categorical taking under Lucas was
relaxed under Pennsylvania law to allow finding a taking where
a
regulation has "substantially deprived the owner of the beneficial use of
his property." 61 7 The court explained that Tahoe-Sierra was not dispositive
as to whether the moratorium constituted a taking under Pennsylvania
law.168
E. Extent of Other Economic Uses of the Property During the
Moratorium
The pre-Tahoe-Sierra cases generally held that a regulation does
not effect a categorical taking if it does not deprive a landowner of all
economically viable use and that a temporary moratorium is not a
categorical taking because it does not take all use. However,
a
moratorium may be a partial taking under Penn Central when the
regulation goes "too far" and the diminution in value is great. On the
other hand, if property values rise during a moratorium, or if there are
alternative viable uses of the property available during a moratorium,
163. Id. at 423 (distinguishing the finality requirement, where there
has yet to be a
determination inflicting an injury, from the exhaustion requirement, where
there has yet to
be a final adjudication of such a determination).
164. Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Bd.of Comm'rs, 57 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. Ind. 1995).
165. 55 Pa. D. & C. 4th 548 (2001).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 550.
168. Id.
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the burden on a property owner is not excessive when balanced against a
legitimate public purpose furthered by the moratorium.
In Golden Valley Lutheran College v. City of Golden Valley, " a oneyear moratorium on all development was held not to cause a taking
under either the Lucas categorical test-because the property had value
at the end of, and could be put to beneficial use during, the
moratorium-or the multifactor balancing test for partial takings set
7°
forth in Penn Central.1
Economic use depends upon the character of the property and
its intended use. The final decision on remand in First English, twice
referred to earlier, holding that a delay of more than two years was not
unreasonable, 171 is largely unknown because it was not newsworthy.
Most people figure that the church won its case in the Supreme Court. It
did not-what it won was the right to plead for money damages as
compensation. In the end the case never went to trial because the church
in the church camp
lost on the pleadings-there was enough residual use
1
campers could
The
claim.
taking
to avoid even a temporary partial
moratorium.
the
during
rebuild
not
camp, even though the church could
camp.
a
Camping is a valuable use at
Even a limited use can save a moratorium. In Merriam Gateway
Ass'n v. Town of Newton," a truly hapless developer purchased a former
shoe factory in 1983 with the intent of converting it into 100 residential
condominium and commercial units. The developer proceeded with the74
project in 1987 after learning that a sewer moratorium had been lifted.
Construction began in March 1988 and final site plan approval was
granted in December 1988275 Just three months later, when the project
was about 80 percent complete, the developer learned that the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) had reimposed
the sewer moratorium almost two years earlier and, accordingly, no
76
certificates of occupancy could be issued. The developer, in claims
against its architects, engineers, and law firms for malpractice and
breach of contract and against the town of Newton, alleged more than
169. 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 92 Uan. 25,1994).
170. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
171. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
210 Cal. App. 3d 1353 (1989) (interim ordinance not a taking).
172. Id. at 1356. See also Oaks v. Montague Township, 2001 Mich. App. Lexis 1839 (2001)
water
(upholding moratorium on building permits until such time as adequate drinking
the
supply could be made available, in part because developer could continue to use or sell
$700,000).
over
at
valued
was
which
site,
the
on
existing single family residence
173. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21562 (D.N.J. June 1, 1992), affd, 91 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 1996).
The hapless developer is of no relation to Dwight H. Merriam.
174. Id. at *2.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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$13 million in damages.'7 The federal trial court held that the developer
had failed to state a Fifth Amendment takings claim because it did not
contend that the property had been rendered useless.'78 The town had
received a special concession from the NJDEP during the moratorium
and had secured hook-ups for 16 units (with other units served by
hauling sewage to another treatment facility), and when the ban was
lifted in November 1990, the plaintiff had been free to pursue the project,
though he did not.79
The importance of reasonable and beneficial economic uses
remaining during a moratorium repeatedly arises. In Collura v. Town of
Arlington, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found it significant that a
two-year moratorium on apartment building construction did not
prohibit all uses within the moratorium district. " Recall also that the city
of Pearl, Mississippi, adopted a two-year moratorium on locating new
mobile-home sales establishments."' The owner of two parcels sued,
claiming a taking and seeking injunctive relief to permit him to place
mobile-home sales establishments on his parcels. 8 2 During his
deposition, the owner conceded that there were other uses for his
properties during the moratorium even though he did not believe they
were as profitable as leasing them for mobile-home sales
establishments. 3 The plaintiff also acknowledged that he had paid
$250,000 for one of the properties that was appraised for $825,000 in
1990.' 8' He also testified that although he could not remember what he
paid for the other parcel, it was appraised at $750,000 at the time of his
deposition, which was taken just after the end of the moratorium. ' In
finding no taking, the court held that, but for the restriction on using his
land for a mobile home sales establishment, the landowner had the
whole "bundle" of rights available to him, and, "[wihere an owner
possesses a full 'bundle' of rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the
bundle is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in the
entirety.""'
Lake Tahoe controversies have spawned many lawsuits, not just
the one recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Kelly v. Tahoe
177. Id. at *3.
178. Id. at *10.
179. Id. at *9-10.
180. Collura v. Town of Arlington, 329 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Mass. 1975).
181. Herrington v. City of Pearl, 908 F. Supp. 418, 420-21 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
182. Id. at 420.
183. Id. at n.10.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 425 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470,
496 (1987)).
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187
Regional Planning Agency, a property owner at Lake Tahoe was unable
to further develop his property for over 13 years. Thereafter, new
regulations greatly reduced the property's development potential.'9 The
Nevada Supreme Court found no taking and held that the Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) could postpone building in critical
areas for a "reasonable period of time" so long as the "benefit received
by the property from the ordinances is direct and substantial and the
burden imposed is proportional."'8 The court noted that the owner had
paid $500,000 for his property, lived in the main house9 for almost 20
years, and sold the main house alone for $1.1 million.' 0 He had also
received another $5.6 million from prior sales of parcels in the planned
unit development."'
Another relevant TRPA takings case is Carpenterv. Tahoe Regional
PlanningAgency.192 Alice Carpenter purchased a parcel at Lake Tahoe in
1973 for $27,950, recorded the deed in 1980, and decided to build a house
in 1981. By then, an ordinance creating a case-by-case review for
development in the basin was in place and a 1980 Compact between
California and Nevada had replaced an earlier 1969 Compact. The 1980
Compact was intended to establish "environmental carrying capacities"
within the Lake Tahoe Basin "while providing for orderly and
94
environmentally safe growth."
On August 26, 1983, "the TRPA governing board temporarily
9
In 1984, the TRPA passed the 1984
suspended" all project permits
Regional Plan, which never took effect because the day it was adopted
the attorney general of California filed suit alleging that the plan violated
in
the 1980 Compact." The two parties to the suit agreed to a settlement
97
1987 with the adoption of the TRPA's 1987 Regional Plan.1 It included
several new elements, such as an Individual Parcel Evaluation System, a
process for transfers of development rights, a system by which property
owners could challenge the land capability classification of their parcels,
98
and a provision for amending plans.'
Carpenter applied for a building permit in 1982, but she never
received it because of the initial ordinance, effective June 25, 1981; a

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

855 P.2d 1027, 1029-33 (Nev. 1993).
Id. at 1032.
Id.at 1035.
Id.
Id. at 1035 n.16.
804 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Nev. 1992) (listing other TRPA-related takings cases).
Id. at 1319.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1320.
Carpenter v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 804 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (D.Nev. 1992).
Id. at 1320-21.
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moratorium on all new building that ran from August 29, 1983, through
April 26, 1984; the 1984 Regional Plan; and the injunction brought on by
the attorney general's suit (from April 27, 1984, through July 14, 1987).'9
Ultimately, she sold her lot to the state of Nevada in 1990 for $185,000 as
part of the state's buyout program of environmentally sensitive Lake
Tahoe area properties. 200
Ruling on the TRPA's motions for summary judgment, the
federal trial court ultimately held that Carpenter's taking claims for the
period from June 25, 1981, through the end of the subsequent
moratorium on April 26, 1984, were ripe because Carpenter had "done
everything that she could have done to get a final answer to her building
permit request," and she had "engaged in every procedure that might
ultimately result in... [the granting of] a building permit." 20 1
In the court's reasoning, First English required that the
government compensate a landowner for a temporary taking if, during
the period of land use restriction, the property owner was "deprived of
all economically viable use of the land., 20 2 Carpenter, who had no
existing permitted use, suffered such a deprivation.20' "In other words,
even if use of the property is eventually restored to the owner, the owner
can still sue for a temporary taking. ' , 2° ' The temporary prohibition and
the temporary loss occurred; it was a taking and it must be
compensated. 2' Thus, the fact that plaintiff sold her property should
have no impact on any temporary taking claim, although the court
allowed in a footnote that "[t]he result would probably differ in the case
of a claimed permanent taking." 2°6
The Carpenter court did not hold that every moratorium is a
temporary taking; indeed, on the facts of the case no facial taking was
found.2 7 What the court did say is that if a long period of prohibited use
includes a short time during which use is totally precluded by a
moratorium, and there is no economically beneficial permitted use, then
there is a temporary taking, and the property owner should be
compensated-even if the property has value when it is subsequently
sold.2 8

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 1323-25.
Id. at 1320.
Id.at 1323.
Carpenter v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 804 F. Supp. 1316, 1327 (D. Nev. 1992).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1327 n.15.
Id. at 1325-26.
Id. at 1325-28.
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F. Availability of Local Administrative Relief
In City of Pearl, the Federal District Court in Mississippi distinguished the finality requirement (government must reach a final,
determinative position) from the exhaustion requirement (state remedies
must be pursued first).1 ' A potentially successful challenge to an illegal
moratorium is not ripe for judicial consideration where an applicant has
not satisfied both the finality and the exhaustion requirements. Many of
the reported moratorium cases have considered ripeness but offer little
guidance on what is required for finality and exhaustion.
The New York State Legislature imposed a moratorium on
development along Beaverdam Creek in the town of Brookhaven so the
creek could be studied for possible inclusion in New York State's Wild,
20
Scenic, and Recreational Rivers System. The court dismissed a property
owner's claim for just compensation on the ground that he had not
exhausted administrative remedies and had, therefore, not established a
regulatory taking.211 The owner had not proven that he had applied for
2 12
an exemption from the moratorium before filing suit. The New York
appeals court affirmed, stating that it could not consider the owner's
2 3
takings claim without an adequate administrative record. The state had
not denied the property owner an exemption from the moratorium, so
had not yet been denied "an economically viable use of its
the owner
, 214
land.
Most courts recognize a futility exception to the finality or
exhaustion requirements. In Deal Gardens, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey noted generally it should decline to adjudicate an attack upon an
ordinance where the applicant had not sought relief before a board of
adjustment.215 The court, however, held that the applicant's claim was
ripe, because the moratorium precluded the issuance of permits and it
216
would have been futile for the applicant to apply for one. Some courts
interpret the futility exception much more narrowly than others.

209. Herrington v. City of Pearl, 908 F. Supp. 418, 423 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
210. Timber Ridge Homes v. State, 637 N.Y.S.2d 179, 179 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1996).
211. Id. at 179.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Deal Gardens, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Village Loch Arbour, 226 A.2d 607, 609
(N.J. 1967).
216. Id. at 610.
217. See, e.g., Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1987) (cited in Zilber v.
Town of Moraga, 692 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Cal. 1988), for the proposition that the futility
exception to the finality doctrine was narrowly defined in the Ninth Circuit, in effect,
forcing form over substance).
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In Bradfordville Phipps, the Florida Court of Appeals went out of
its way to find that a plaintiff's claim was not ripe.21 Leon County,
Florida, enacted a moratorium on certain development permits, pursuant
to a court-ordered injunction."9 The court dismissed the plaintiff's
regulatory taking challenge to the moratorium on the grounds that the
plaintiff never sought to have its property exempted from the coverage
of the moratorium, and the plaintiff made no effort to intervene in the
earlier lawsuit or to challenge the injunction pursuant to which the
moratorium was enacted.2 °
Several cases illustrate how local administrative relief
procedures might be added to ordinances to facilitate applicants and
local governments meeting halfway without resort to the courts. In the
landmark case of Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, the challenged
ordinance severely limited the issuance of building permits by
conditioning the issuance of such permits upon the existence of requisite
capital improvements. m The ordinance allowed landowners to expedite
permit issuance by constructing improvements themselves.2 z Along the
same lines, the ordinance in Cottle Enterprises,Inc. v. Town of Farmington24
temporarily restricted the issuance of sewer hookup permits but
expressly allowed for the installation of temporary septic systems in
accordance with state guidelines, to be replaced upon the expiration of
the moratorium. Likewise, in Zilber v. Town of Moraga,2 the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California held that an applicant's
claim was not ripe where the applicant failed to seek a "status
determination" under a moratorium ordinance. That determination
would have established whether the applicant's property was subject to
a ridge and hillside permitting moratorium2 6 These ordinances were
upheld and can be contrasted with ordinances that do not provide
exemption or clarification procedures, or ordinances, like that in the
Seawall case, where the buyout provision itself evidenced the disparate
7
burden placed upon certain landowners.2

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Bradfordville Phipps Ltd. v. Leon County, 804 So. 2d 464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 466.
Id. at 467.
285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972).
Id. at 296.
Id. at 300-01.
693 A.2d 330, 332 (Me. 1997).
692 F. Supp. 1195, 1207 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
Id.at 1197.
See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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III. TAHOE-SIERRA IN LIGHT OF PRIOR LAW
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Supreme Court affirmed six to three the
Ninth Circuit's decision, with Justice Stevens writing for the majority
that included Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas.
The decision is more limited than most government lawyers
might wish. The Court held that a 32-month moratorium designed to
8
save an important natural resource was not a facial or per se taking2
The Court expressly stated that its decision was intended to be a narrow
one: "Although the question we decide relates only to that 32-month
period... [we] will clarify the narrow scope of our holding."2 At the
same time, in dictum, the Court enthusiastically and expansively
supported planning, recognizing explicitly that good planning was
essential and took time and that delays from planning would often
benefit property owners by enhancing property values.'
First English, stated Justice Stevens, was "unambiguously" a
remedy case in which the issue of a moratorium was irrelevant to the
holding.'' Thus, the district court was wrong to use First English as a
32
basis for holding that a moratorium was a per se taking. The peculiar
Lucas decision is now probably nothing more than a footnote in the
history of takings law, having had no discernable effect on takings
jurisprudence. In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court has so limited Lucas that it is
3
doubtful we will ever see another categorical regulatory taking.
However, the Court gave no guidance on how to develop
defensible moratoria. A review of earlier moratoria cases, as we have
seen, suggests that defensible moratoria, among other things, must
protect significant public interests, be narrowly tailored and of the
shortest reasonable duration, and allow for limited uses of property
during the moratoriia, if possible.2m A defensible moratorium might also
have an "escape hatch" to allow property owners to buy their way out,
as in Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, 5 the landmark growth
management case.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
(2001).

Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 320-31.
Id. at 306-07.
Id. at 337-39 & nn.32, 33,338-340.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 329.
See Dwight H. Merriam, Reengineering Regulation to Avoid Takings, 33 URB. LAW. 1

234.

ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE

CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENAL REGULATION 272-78 (1999).
235. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972).
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Governments are still at risk in using moratoria, as the Court did
not hold that a moratorium could never be a facial taking. An indefinite
or extremely long moratorium that does little to protect an important
public interest, other than stop development, might well be a facial
taking. Certainly, there still will be as-applied takings claims for
moratoria, and at least one property owner won big before Tahoe-Sierra.26
The most interesting issue in Tahoe-Sierra is that of the "relevant
parcel," sometimes called the "denominator question." The polar
opposites are the "parcel-as-a-whole" rule at one extreme and
"segmentation" at the other. 3 7 With takings, the first questions are what
is the property taken and what is its relationship to the claimant's total
holdings.238 The property taken is the "numerator," and the total
property owned is the "denominator," or relevant parcel.
When we look at the totality of the property, we are using the
parcel-as-a-whole rule discussed in Penn Central. In Penn Central, even
though the denial of the tower on top of Grand Central Terminal greatly
diminished the value of the terminal parcel, the Court considered all of
the nearby holdings of the railroad, including its underground system,
exclusive railroad franchise, and ownership of abutting and nearby
properties. 39 The diminution in value for the Grand Central Terminal,
when compared with all of the railroad's holdings, was so small as not to
meet the first of the three-part takings test.2"
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court strongly reinforced the whole parcel
rule and rejected segmentation.241 Segmentation is a way of "slicing and
dicing" the relevant parcel to increase the ratio of the property taken to
the property held. For example, if a takings claimant has ten acres of
wetlands in a 100-acre parcel, and all of the wetlands are prohibited from
development, it is either a 10 percent taking of a 100-acre parcel, or a 100
percent taking of a 10-acre segmented parcel. After Tahoe-Sierra, a
property owner generally will not be able to segment the 10 acres from
the 100-acre parcel .2
236. River Oaks Marine, Inc. v. Town of Grand Island, 1993 WL 27486 (W.D.N.Y 1993)
($1,149,149.43 in damages for prohibition against removing earth products during a
moratorium).
237. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 331.
238. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 234, at 144-45.
239. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129-31,135-36 (1978).
240. Id. at 137-38.
241. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 330-31.
242. See id. Segmentation is still possible, however, especially in mining cases. Compare
two post-Tahoe-Sierramining cases, decided on the same day, showing, at least under state
laws, that courts may segment the parcel. See Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 2002 WL
31889325 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (holding that mining rights and real property together are a single
parcel); but see, State ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 780 N.E.2d 998 (Ohio 2002) (Supreme Court
of Ohio holding that coal rights constitute a separate and distinct property interest and
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Justice Stevens finally had his way in Tahoe-Sierra. In his First
English dissent, he identified three measures of the relevant parcel; in
Tahoe-Sierra, he made them part of the majority opinion. 24 3 Property is
measured physically in its area, subsurface rights, and air rights.2" That
is the relevant parcel we usually think of, as in the Penn Central case.
Justice Stevens, however, also identified the "functional parcel," which is
the development potential in bulk, density, and use.
Finally, and critically important in Tahoe-Sierra,property can also
be measured over time. 26 A 32-month moratorium, as compared with an
average of 25 years that owners held lots at Lake Tahoe before
development, as further compared with the much longer physical life of
real property, could never meet Penn Central's first prong of diminution
in value. The property owners claimed a 32-month complete taking of
the 32 months of their period of ownership during which they could do
nothing with their property. The Court held that temporally the parcelas-whole, the relevant parcel, was much longer than 32 months.
Still, there will be tough issues of what is the relevant parcel.
Many factors affect the determination of the relevant parcel, including
when separate properties were purchased, whether the properties are
near or abut each other, whether they are similarly zoned, whether they
are held in single ownership, and whether the properties are treated as a
single entity for development and use.
Justice Stevens discussed "fairness and justice" in land use
regulation and offered seven different ways the claim could be
analyzed. 24 "Fairness and justice," even though the Court says it
underlies the Takings Clause, is an evolving and still emerging analytic
construct that transcends constitutional doctrine. The Court has
considered the questions of fairness and justice in takings and other
constitutional law cases without necessarily using these terms.4 9 It is an
parcel); see also Vellequette v. Town of Woodside, 2002 WL 1614358 (Cal.App.1 Dist.)
(discussed at length later herein for proposition that it may still be difficult to determine
relevant parcel). For an in depth discussion of the relevant parcel issue, see Merriam, supra
note 15.
243. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
330-31 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330-31.
244. Tahoe-Sierra,535 U.S. at 322-23.
245. Id. at 326-27.
246. Id. at 331-32.
247. Id. at 332.
248. Id. at 331-42.
249. See, e.g., Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999). During the oral
arguments in Del Monte Dunes, Justice Scalia said he thought the developer might feel that
he was being "jerked around" and that after a while one might begin to "smell a rat." 1998
WL. 721087, at 17 (1998). In Village of Willowbrook v. Oleck, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), the Court
looked favorably on an elderly widow who had been delayed, allegedly unfairly, in
hooking up to municipal water after her well failed.
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expression of the Court's desire to have more subjective balancing and
greater flexibility in deciding such cases. We likely will see fewer brightline rules and we are headed toward an even more ad hoc takings
analysis.
IV. POST-TAHOE MORATORIUM DECISIONS
There have been many reported regulatory takings cases citing
Tahoe-Sierra in the year since it was decided, but only a handful involve
moratoria or relevant interim development ordinances. Perhaps this is
because the approach to moratorium cases has not changed much in the
wake of the Tahoe-Sierra decision. In any event, the post-Tahoe-Sierra
moratorium cases are taken up in this section in chronological order. We
conclude this section with a brief mention of the recent follow-up case to
Tahoe-Sierra in the Ninth Circuit.
Shortly after the Tahoe-Sierra decision, a federal magistrate
issued a recommended decision in a takings challenge to an interim
growth ordinance adopted by the town of York, Maine. 2'0 The ordinance
stated that the town would issue no more than seven dwelling unit
permits per month and that it would not accept more than two dwelling
unit applications for any single subdivision in any one month.51 The
stated purpose for the ordinance was to deal with growth explosion, and
the ordinance was to terminate automatically three years after being
enacted, unless otherwise extended. 2
The magistrate recommended that summary judgment be
granted in favor of the town on most counts. 3 He found that the
ordinance was not a zoning ordinance and did not need to comply with
the state planning legislation.2 The magistrate found that a plaintiff
building association had no standing and had sustained no economic
injury where none of the association's members had sought to build in
the town.25 He recommended that a facial challenge be dismissed under
Tahoe-Sierra because the ordinance was temporary.2 The magistrate
opined that a plaintiff who claimed that his business had been destroyed,
but who had not applied for a permit in the town, had not suffered
injury to a protected interest either under the federal or the Maine
constitutions where it appeared that plaintiff could continue to carry on

250.
251.

Courier Builders, Inc. v. Town of York, 2002 WL 1146773 (D. Me. May 30, 2002).
Id. at *2.

252.
253.
254.

Id. *2-3.
Id. *16.
Id. at *11.

255.
256.

Id. at *8.
Courier Builders, Inc. v. Town of York, 2002 WL 1146773, *9 (D. Me. May 30, 2002).
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business elsewhere without significant hardship. 57 Finally, the
magistrate recommended that the court deny the town's motion for
summary judgment with respect to a partial taking claim because Penn
Central balancing factors were in dispute.'
The case of Vellequette v. Town of Woodside29 illustrates that tough
facts may continue to make the relevant parcel determination difficult. In
1968, the town of Woodside, California, passed a resolution providing
that the three lots in question were "to be 'recombined into one."'26 This
was done pursuant to a request by the then owner of the lots that the
three sewer assessments on the lots be reduced to a single such
assessment. 261 Instead of combining the lots into a single one, the town
simply spread the single assessment over the three lots-one half of an
assessment to one lot and one quarter each to the other two lots. 262 In
1986, the original owner of the lots sold them to Vellequette and in July
of 1994 the town adopted a moratorium on sewer hook-ups, prohibiting
the issuance of new sewer connection permits to properties that had not
fully paid assessments until additional sewer capacity was available in
the town.2 &1 Not one of Vellequette's three lots was eligible for a sewer
hookup during the moratorium because of the way the assessment was
allocated, and the plaintiff challenged the ordinance as a taking. The
California appellate court found no Lucas categorical or Penn Central
partial taking. 26
The court had some difficulty defining the relevant parcel in this
particular case, in large part because the record did not clearly establish
whether there were three lots or one. The record showed that in 1992 the
town had informed the plaintiff that there was some question as to
whether the lots in question constituted a single lot for development
purposes or three separate lots, but that he could obtain a certificate of
compliance that would clear up the uncertainty. 2 5 The plaintiff did not
seek such a certificate. 26 The court, relying at least in part upon a
statement in Lucas, effectively collapsed its consideration of the plaintiff's
reasonable investment-backed expectations into its definition of the
relevant parcel. 267 As a result, the court avoided actually finding a

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. at *15.
Id.
2002 WL 1614358 (Cal. App.1 Dist. 2002).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2-*5.
Id. at "9-*12.
2002 WL 1614358, n.5 (Cal. App.1 Dist. 2002).
Id.
Id. at *10-*11.
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relevant parcel in this instance by concluding that, whether the lots were
one or three, the plaintiff could, or had the opportunity to, recoup his
investment-backed expectations, even under the moratorium.2" The
court held that (1) the plaintiff had a fully paid sewer assessment if he
combined his lots, (2) he never believed he had three separate full sewer
assessments, (3) the lots could be developed if combined to construct a
house worth almost over $1.5 million, and (4) in determining the
economic value of the relevant parcel, it made no sense to ignore the
value of the three lots combined into one.269
In Haberman v. City of Long Beach,270 a New York appellate court
affirmed the denial of plaintiff's summary judgment claim that a city had
taken property by imposing, and subsequently extending, a
development moratorium for over three years. When the city extended
its moratorium, it lifted the moratorium on certain properties, but not the
plaintiff's. 27' Consequently, the plaintiff brought an equal protection
claim, alleging disparate treatment. 272 The court held that the equal
protection claim had no merit, because the differing treatment for
properties within the Superblock "furthered a 'legitimate, articulated
state purpose,' i.e., the development of the Superblock properties as a
single site."In Berst v. Snohomish County,274 the Washington Court of Appeals
reversed a lower court dismissal for failure to state a claim and, in so
doing, addressed a landowner's taking claim against Snohomish County
for imposing a building moratorium under the state Forest Practices Act.
The court of appeals cited Tahoe-Sierra for the proposition that Lucas and
First English did not apply in the context of a temporary moratorium.
The Court found that it was not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that
there were no facts on the record to support recovery under Penn Central
and Tahoe-Sierra.76 The court declined to adopt plaintiff's "novel"
argument that "the imposition of a moratorium in the absence of due
process rights constitutes an unconstitutional taking." 277 Rather, the court
reiterated that Penn Central and Tahoe-Sierrawere the rule.

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id.
Id. at *9-'12.
298 A.D.2d 497 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2002).
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id. (quoting Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y. 2d 48,56 (1987).
57 P.3d 273 (2002).
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id. at 280.
Id.
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The Federal Claims Court's decision in Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. United States,2' though a delay rather than a moratorium case,
suggests the effect the Tahoe-Sierradecision will have upon moratorium
cases. In Bass Enterprises,the court of claims reversed its prior finding of
a compensable regulatory taking upon motion for reconsideration in
light of Tahoe-Sierra. Prior to reconsideration, the court held that the
Bureau of Land Management had taken plaintiff's property (a Lucas
categorical take) by denying plaintiff's applications to exploit oil and gas
leases for almost four years, pending an Environmental Protection
Agency determination as to whether activities under the leases would
render a proposed nuclear storage facility unstable. 280 The second time
around, the Claims Court applied a Penn Central partial taking analysis,
given the temporary nature of the governmental denial in this case, and
held that the public interest in ensuring the stability of a nuclear storage
facility negated the taking. 1 In confirming that the Lucas categorical
taking could not occur where a regulation was temporary, the Claims
Court stated,
It is important to note that the [Tahoe-Sierra] Court's
consideration included the policy implications of a
categorical rule in such cases, and found that it could result
in government agencies' [sic] being constrained by financial
considerations to the extent that they may be forced to rush
through the planning process. 282
In W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Cambridge City Council,28 a property
owner challenged a 23-month combination zoning change/building
moratorium designed to preserve the status quo during a comprehensive
planning study period. The Massachusetts Court of Appeals upheld the
enactment of the interim restriction, relying upon the Collura case to hold
that
[tihe broad authority vested in municipalities to zone for
public purposes has been held to justify the imposition of
[and] "reasonable
reasonable time limits on development ....
interim zoning provisions may be enacted within the scope
of a general zoning enabling act, without reliance on
specific statutory authorization for interim ordinances." 28'
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
(1975)).

2002 WL 31526504 (Fed. Cl.2002).
Id. at *1-*3.
Id.at*6.
Id.at *3 (citing Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337-39).
779 N.E.2d 141 (2002).
Id.at 149 (quoting in part Collura v. Town of Arlington, 329 N.E.2d 733, 737
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The court of appeals further held that the fact that the planning working
group could not agree upon a result after the study period did not alone
constitute evidence of bad faith-even where the result of their inability
to agree was consistent with the objectives of the "anti-Grace"
neighborhood group.28 5
The court of appeals upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff's taking
claim on summary judgment, under Penn Central and Tahoe-Sierra.2' The
court observed that during the period of the moratorium the plaintiff
was allowed to continue to make use of existing facilities on the
burdened property, so the regulation did not deny the plaintiff all
economic use of its property. As to the plaintiff's investment-backed
expectations argument, the court said,
A property owner cannot reasonably rely on an assumption
that zoning will forever remain the same, and that
government will refrain indefinitely from valid changes in
zoning ....
Simply stated, a developer with designs on
improving its property consistent with an existing zoning
framework had best get its shovel into the groundY.
In a recent Georgia case regarding moratorium enabling issues,
the Supreme Court of Georgia struck down a county ordinance setting a
three-year moratorium on the construction of high voltage power lines,
because the court found that this moratorium violated the Georgia
Constitution prohibiting the enactment of a local or special law
regulating that which was already regulated by a general state law.2"
Because an electrical co-op was granted exclusive condemning authority
under state law to construct power lines, an ordinance interfering with
the construction of high voltage lines was held to interfere with the coop's eminent domain power. 2819
Finally, in the fifth round (Tahoe-Sierra V) of Tahoe-Sierra litigation, the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the lower court's dismissal of
certain of the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council's 1987 TRPA plan
takings claims on res judicata grounds, given that the claims were
essentially identical to earlier claims brought by the Council in the last
two Tahoe-Sierra rounds.m Judge Reinhardt, writing for the Ninth
Circuit, in upholding the dismissal said,
285. W.R. Grace, 779 N.E.2d at 149.
286. Id. at 154-57.
287. Id. at 156 (citing Daddario v. Cape Cod Comm., 681 N.E.2d 833 (1997)).
288. Rabun County High Voltage Line Constr. Moratorium Ordinance v. Ga. Transm.
Corp., 575 S.E.2d 474 (2003).
289. Id.
290. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg' Planning Agency, 322 F.3d
1064 (9th Cir. 2003). See also http://www.law.Georgetown.edu/gelpi/takings/courts/
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After eighteen years of litigation, ten years of which has
been devoted to adjudicating harm allegedly done by the
1987 Plan and its implementation, the final judgments of
Tahoe III and Tahoe IV should finally rest in peace. We
steadfastly protect a litigant's right to his day in court. Once
a sophisticated party has had a full and fair opportunity to
be heard, however, we also recognize the merits of
finality .... 29
The court of appeals also found it "telling" that Tahoe V had been filed
while Tahoe IV was pending, and the plaintiff's complaint in Tahoe V
conveyed the plaintiff's concern that if Tahoe IV and V went forward
together there would be at least some duplicity of claims.2
The court dismissed the as-applied takings claims on ripeness,
rather than on res judicata grounds.'
The 1987 Plan allowed
landowners, only marginally on the outside of the developable pool of
properties, to pay mitigation fees or pursue mitigation projects to make
their properties developable.94 The court held that those landowners'
claims were not ripe if they had not appealed them to the TRPA." 5
Tahoe-Sierra is a relevant parcel case and correctly cites First
English as a remedies case. Also, the Tahoe-Sierra Court suggests that a
moratorium, because it is temporary, is unlikely to be a Lucas categorical
taking.2 These two points, however, were already evident from the preTahoe-Sierra cases. The duration of a moratorium is analyzed
29 7 interdependently with other factors and balanced under Penn Central.
V. MORATORIA IN THE POST-TAHOE-SIERRA WORLD
The Tahoe-Sierra decision is indeed a narrow one, limited to its
facts and the limited holding on the facial claim. It is clear that TahoeSierra does little to alter prior precedent in moratorium cases. It is
unlikely to have any significant impact on as-applied claims, except by
extending the relevant parcel from the physical and functional

snap.htm (excellent regulatory takings case tracker) (last visited Aug. 9, 2003). This was not
on remand from the Supreme Court's decision.
291. Id. at 1077.
292. ld. at 1081.
293. Id. at 1077.
294. Id. at 1084.
295. Id. at 1085-86.
296. See, e.g., Vellequette v. Town of Woodside, 2002 WL 1614358 (Cal. App. 1 Dist.
2002).
297. See, e.g., Haberman v. City of Long Beach, 298 A.D.2d 497 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't
Oct. 21, 2002).
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dimensions to include the temporal dimension, which is often the most
important dimension in a moratorium case.
Defensible Moratoria
Given the precedent before the Tahoe-Sierra decision, most of
which Tahoe-Sierraleft undisturbed; the Tahoe-Sierra holding; and the few
post-Tahoe-Sierra decisions; the defensible moratorium will likely take
this form:
m Enabled by statute or common law-the defensible
moratorium must have a firm basis in either state statutes
or common law that is consistent with the Tahoe-Sierra
decision. In a footnote to the Tahoe-Sierra decision, the
Court lists a number of states that have enacted express
legislation authorizing interim development ordinances.28
Courts are generally more accepting of moratoria directed
at freezing uses, rather than those that target permitting
processes and procedures, particularly where those
processes and procedures are regulated or authorized by
state statute.2" If a government enacts a moratorium in
response to a perceived emergency, perhaps without strict
adherence to procedural requirements in an enabling
statute, it will still follow as completely as it can, even after
the enactment, all procedural requirements, including those
for notice and hearing.'
Of course, procedural
requirements will depend upon how the enactment is
characterized-as a legislative act, a zoning amendment, or
some other variant.
m Protecting health or safety-the defensible moratorium
will further "heavy-weight" objectives of the police power,
principally the public's health and safety. Lesser objectives,
say the enhancement of tourism or even aesthetics, will not
be as defensible. 0' The moratorium ordinance will state its
purpose on its face. 2

298. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. n.37; see also Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., Tahoe and Beyond:
Defensible Moratoria-California's Experience, 3 (paper presented at the APA National
Planning Conference, Denver, Colorado, Apr. 1, 2003), available at http://www.caed.asu.
edu/apa/proceedings03/CURTIN2/curtin2.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2003).
299. See, e.g., supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 111-153 and accompanying text.
302. Id.
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0 Limited in time-the defensible moratorium will be for
no longer than is necessary to protect the public's interest.
Some may see the adoption of a moratorium as a failure of
planning; however, the moratorium itself must be planned
in its adoption, in the actions taken during its effective
period, and in the implementation of new policies and
regulations once the moratorium has been terminatednl3
Government actions taken consistent with the stated
purpose of the moratorium and during the moratorium
period are particularly relevant where the termination of
the moratorium will occur upon the occurrence of an event,
rather than upon a date certain.
m Limited in physical dimension-the defensible moratorium
will use the smallest physical area of restriction to limit
unintended consequences and adverse impacts beyond
those necessary to carry out the objectives of the
moratorium9
m Limited in its functional impact-the defensible
moratorium along the second dimension of the relevant
parcel-the
functional
dimension-will
limit
the
moratorium to those functions or uses of property that
must be suspended to carry out the purposes of the
moratorium. A moratorium that restricts more than those
essential functions will be subject to successful challenge. "'
A defensible moratorium will seek to preserve some
functional use of the property so that there is a reasonable,
beneficial economic use remaining in the property even
during the moratorium. 08
* Available local relief-finally, to the extent possible, a
defensible and well-constructed moratorium will expressly
provide alternatives or exceptions from coverage that may
minimize the impact of the moratorium upon affected
landowners. A defensible moratorium will not impose
upon private property owners unnecessarily, and when it
does, local procedures should provide an effective escape

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

See supra notes 73-153 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 95-110 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 154-168 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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hatch for a landowner to get out from under the coverage
of the moratorium. Maintaining the flexibility to avoid
protracted and expensive litigation is in the best interest of
regulators and property owners alike.
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Co. v. United States,
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Heights v. Sheffield
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S.W. 3d 634
Loen v. Newtown
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Hampton, 261 A.D.
2d 609
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West Windsor
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Super. 540
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Tex., 27 F. Supp. 2d
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County, 84 Wash.
App. 602
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L.P. v. Jefferson
County
216 Sutter Bay
Assocs. v. County
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Steele v. Cape
Corp., 111 Md.
App. I
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Brookhaven, Inc. v.
State of New York,
223 A.D. 2d 635
Matson v. Clark
County Board of
Comm'rs, 79 Wash.
App. 641
Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Bd.
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County Ind., 57
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Williams v. City of
Central, 907 P.2d
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F. Supp. 418
HBP Assocs. v.
Langdon Marsh,
893 F. Supp. 271
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Supp. 498
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Supp. 1146
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Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
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Bowles, 31 Fed. Cl.
37
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Lutheran College v.
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App. LEXIS 92
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1513 U.S. 819 (1994) 1
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Hunkins v. City of
Minneapolis, 508
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Carpenter v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning
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Co., Inc. v. Planning
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of Town of
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Conn. 152
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Ass'n v. Township
Comm. of
Township of Dover,
191 N.J. Super. 627
State of Tenn., Ex.
Rel. SCA Chemical
Waste Servs., Inc. v.
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Snohomish County,
28 Wash. App. 848
Sturges v. Town of
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Mass. 246
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Supp. 281
Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S.
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Town of Grand
Chute v. City of
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Transp. Co. v. New
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Associated Home
Builders of Greater
East Bay, Inc. v.
City of Livermore,
18 Cal. 3d 582
Almquist v. Town
of Marshan, 308
Minn. 52
Collura v. Town of
Arlington, 367
Mass. 881
Constr. Indus.
Ass'n of Sonoma
County v.
Petaluma, 522 F.2d
897
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of Fairfax County v.
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Union Oil Co. of
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F. 2d 743
Metro. Dade
County v. Rosell
Constr. Corp., 297
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City of Dallas v.
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S.W. 2d. 654
CEEED v. Cal.
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Conservation
Comm'n, 33 Cal.
App. 3d 306
CREED v. Cal.
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Conservation
Comm., 43
Cal.App.3d 306
Golden v. Planning
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N.Y. 2d 359
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Dev. Agency v.
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